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Abstract
Information goods, such as journal articles, require substantial initial invest-
ment, but low incremental reproduction and distribution costs. Advances in
computing and digital communications have nearly eliminated these incremen-
tal costs. Thus, positive per-item prices are inefficient because they discourage
consumption with value greater than marginal cost. Further, very low per item
prices will not recover first-copy costs and thus firms will not have an incentive
to create new content. Bundling may be desirable in such a market: individuals
pay no marginal fee for each item consumed and the producer is able to recover
investment expenses through the bundled sales.
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Most previous research on bundling assumes a monopoly seller and stochas-
tically identical consumers. In this paper we analyze the profitability and wel-
fare properties of bundling information goods in a multi-firm setting. We also
introduce a feasible but flexible specification for heterogeneous consumer prefer-
ences. Modeling heterogeneity resolves unrealistic predictions about efficiency
and distribution from the prior literature. Introducing competition from a sec-
ond firm selling imperfect substitutes results in much lower prices yet only a
moderate profit reduction. Bundling leads to particularly fierce competition
since consumers either buy all of a firm’s collection or nothing. As a result,
competition weakens, and sometimes reverses, the strong advantage known for
monopoly bundling. We find that although lower profit under competition re-
duces the incentive to create new content, the distributional efficiency gains in
this differentiated product market typically outweigh the welfare cost of reduced
creation.
1 Introduction
Computing and digital communications costs have both decreased at the remarkable
rate of about 30% per year since the early 1960s (MacKie-Mason and Varian 1996).
Such a revolutionary shift in information technology costs is enabling revolutions in
product configuration and pricing structures. For example, it is not economically
feasible for the New York Times to sell articles individually when it is necessary to
print articles separately and physically deliver them to customers through the postal
system. However, when all articles are available on a Web site, it becomes feasible
for consumers to download and pay for only those articles they desire to read, which
indeed is the model implemented by the New York Times for its archives.
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Information goods are characterized by high fixed (first-copy) costs, but low costs
for the production of additional copies. This cost structure characterizes print-on-
paper publishing too, but is greatly exaggerated in electronic publishing. Standard
linear pricing for electronic information goods cannot result in efficient production or
distribution because pricing at (near-zero) marginal cost would not recover the initial
fixed costs. The flexibility of digital technology also permits a wider range of responses
to the cost problem. Consequently, there is great uncertainty about how markets for
electronic publishing will evolve. For example, in the industry of scholarly publishing,
University presidents and librarians are expressing alarm that the introduction of
electronic publication and distribution seems to be increasing prices for scholarly
journals (Gilpin 1997). We offer some insight into how the interaction between new
technologies and the competitive environment is likely to affect readers, authors and
publishers.
Several authors have recently studied a monopolist that sells information goods
as a bundle (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1998, Chuang and Sirbu 1998, MacKie-Mason
and Riveros 1998). When consumers have approximately the same average valuation
for items in a bundle, monopoly bundling can generate more revenue than per-item
selling by capturing the common average value while smoothing out idiosyncratic
preferences. In addition, if per transaction costs are significant monopoly bundling
may be profitable. In this paper we study the use of bundling when firms compete
in the selling of information goods. Thus, we address the interaction between market
structure and bundled pricing strategies.
We address several questions. How much does competition curb the ability of
bundling firms to extract value from consumers? What is the net effect of information
goods bundling on social welfare, taking into account both consumers’ surplus and
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profits? What are the dynamic implications of bundling for the surplus necessary to
induce investment in the new creation of information goods?
We study a specific problem, but one with broad relevance given recent advances
in digital information production and electronic distribution. Two firms each produce
multiple imperfect substitutes (consistent with copyright and reputation effects, the
latter important for experience goods such as information products). They consider
bundling, component pricing, and mixed bundling. There may be substantial sunk
costs to create the goods, but the marginal cost of reproducing and distributing
the goods is zero. An important contribution of our work, for the analysis of both
monopoly and competitive bundling, is that we study both consumers stochastically
identical in their average valuation of the bundled goods (consistent with much of the
prior literature) and consumers with heterogeneous preferences.
As previous research has shown for a monopoly, bundling is usually more prof-
itable than selling items separately. However, with more than one firm, bundling also
results in rather fierce competition. Thus the distribution of surplus between firm
and consumer is quite different than for a monopoly. We find that a duopoly serving
a diverse population of consumers is drastically more efficient than a monopoly. A
duopoly will result in much lower prices for the consumers, much higher social welfare,
and only a moderate reduction in firms’ profits.
Our results when consumers’ preferences are ex ante heterogeneous reinforce the
effectiveness of competition from even one firm. Prices are much lower and social
welfare higher than for a monopoly. We are also able to offer new insight into two
issues raised by the prior literature. The standard results for stochastically identical
consumers have been that a bundling monopolist achieves the first best allocation and
simultaneously extracts 100% of consumers’ surplus. Neither of these results seem
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to describe many information markets. Our model of a market with heterogeneous
preferences provides one possible explanation for what we observe in actual markets.
In our model, bundling is not generally fully efficient, and sometimes is even less
efficient than per item selling. In addition, consumers retain a significant share of
total surplus.
Our results on the effect of competition on static efficiency and surplus distribu-
tion raise questions about the dynamic efficiency of a competitive information goods
market. Lower profit reduces the incentive to invest in information product creation.
With stochastically identical consumers we find that the received profit leads to just
the right amount of new creation. With heterogeneous consumers neither a monopoly
nor a duopoly have efficient incentives to create new content. In our model, monopoly
creation is closer to the social optimum. However, the duopoly is usually socially pre-
ferred because its lower prices result in sufficiently greater distribution of new content
to outweigh the smaller creation effort.
In Section 2 we provide a brief review of prior research. We introduce a general
model of consumer demand and present analytical results for stochastically identi-
cal consumers in Section 3. In Section 4 we employ numerical methods to analyze
competitive bundling when consumer preferences are meaningfully heterogeneous. In
Section 5, we allow firms to endogenously determine how much to invest in new
content. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Prior Research
In their seminal paper on bundling Adams and Yellen (1976) consider a monopo-
list producing two goods. They analyze three pricing strategies: component selling
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(each good priced and sold individually), bundling (both goods sold together) and
mixed bundling (consumers offered choice between buying a bundle or individual
components). They show by example that bundling can result in higher revenue than
component selling. However, bundling might result in inefficient consumption of com-
ponents for which the marginal cost of producing that component exceeds its value
to a consumer. In order to obtain, say, the highly valued good 1, a consumer might
purchase the bundle and thus consume good 2 even if its marginal value is less than its
marginal cost. McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) extend the analysis to gen-
eral demand functions, and provide conditions under which mixed bundling strictly
dominates either of the two pure strategies.1 Salinger (1995) shows that if valuations
for the two goods are not perfectly correlated, the demand for the bundle will be more
price-elastic than the sum of the individual demands for each component. As a result,
bundling is a way to smooth out idiosyncratic preferences enabling a monopolist to
extract more consumers’ surplus than is possible through pure components pricing.
Some recent papers have extended the analysis to more than two goods. In prin-
ciple, with N goods, there are 2N − 1 combinations or bundles that could be offered,
each at a potentially unique price, and consumer preferences would need to be speci-
fied on this 2N−1-dimensional space. Even ignoring consumer information processing
and transactions costs from dealing with an exponentially-large price list, the profit
maximization problem for setting those prices is NP-hard and generally considered
to be computationally intractable for modern computers when N is only moderately
large.2 As a result, nearly all of these papers restrict attention to the same three
1Mixed bundling must perform at least as well as either pure bundling or pure unbundling since
it contains both pure strategies as sub-cases.
2For an exponentially complex problem, doubling the speed of the computer only allows us to
increase the size of the problem by one. For a single scholarly publisher, N might be several thousand
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strategies: components pricing, bundling, and mixed bundling.3 4 We follow the
same approach in this paper.
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1998) illustrate that bundling with N goods is strictly
preferred to components pricing when marginal cost is zero, consumers are stochas-
tically identical (each draws values for an item from the same distribution), and N is
sufficiently large. Chuang and Sirbu (1998) allow for the possibility of mixed bundling
and not surprisingly find that it is more profitable than either of the pure strategies.
They also allow readers to value some articles at less than marginal production cost.
Thus it is possible for component selling to strictly dominate bundling since bundling
results in the costly distribution of products that have below-cost value to some con-
sumers.
Little research has been done on the possibility of bundling when there is more
than one firm. Fishburn, Odlyzko, and Siders (2000) consider a duopoly in which
each firm produces an identical set of N information goods (perfect substitutes). By
assumption, one firm bundles while the other offers component pricing. In nearly
all of their numerical simulations, a price war ensues with both firms’ prices falling
towards zero (marginal cost). This situation, although nearing static efficiency, erodes
the incentive to create new content.
Matutes and Regibeau (1992) and Farrell, Monroe, and Saloner (1998) consider
duopolists that produce complements rather than substitutes. In their work, both
articles per year; Elsevier Science publishes several hundred thousand.
3In one exception, Hanson and Martin (1990) tackle the full 2N bundle pricing problem with N
= 21.
4MacKie-Mason and Riveros (1998) introduce a new alternative: generalized subscriptions. Con-
sumers prepay for G tokens, then select G items from the entire collection after the items are created.
In effect, individual-specific sub-bundles are created. Riveros (1999) comparatively evaluates gener-
alized subscriptions against the three most studied strategies.
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goods must be purchased to form a system, though it might be possible to purchase
the components from separate firms.5 In our work we consider imperfect substitutes
and consumers can vary the number of different articles that they consume. Some
authors examine bundling as a tying strategy when one firm is a monopolist over
one product but faces potential competition for a second product (see, e.g., Carbajo,
Meza, and Seidmann 1990, Whinston 1990, and Aron and Wildman 1999).6 We
assume that there is (imperfect) competition over all goods.
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) is most closely related to our research. They also
consider a duopoly in an N -good market. However, two main characteristics differ-
entiate our approaches. First, they only consider consumers who are (stochastically)
identical. We obtain results for a market in which consumers have heterogeneous
preferences. The assumption of stochastically identical (i.e., ex ante homogeneous)
preferences is quite restrictive: for example, it implies that a monopolist will maxi-
mize social welfare but will extract all available consumers’ surplus. Second, they only
consider goods that are pair-wise substitutes: the demand for one good is independent
of the demand for all but one of the remaining goods. This drastically restricts the
possible strategic interactions. In our model one firm’s bundle of information items
is an imperfect substitute for all of the items offered by the second firm, and thus
depresses their value. Consequently, we find quite different equilibrium prices, and a
quite different distribution of surplus.
5Nalebuff (2000) finds that a firm that sells a bundle of complementary products will have a
substantial advantage over rivals who sell the component products individually.
6Nalebuff (1999) explores how bundling can be used as an entry deterrent.
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3 Stochastically identical Consumers
In this section we analyze the market when consumers are ex ante stochastically
identical. By ”ex ante” we refer to their preferences in terms of stochastic value
distributions, before the realized value of each item is revealed to each consumer.
We assume that firms cannot distinguish between buyers except through how many
items they purchase. Therefore, there is no opportunity for third-degree price dis-
crimination, and pricing can usefully vary only by the number of items purchased
(second-degree discrimination). Further, we assume that the distributions of con-
sumer values for each individual item are ex ante identical, so there is no advantage
to charging different prices for different items. Since we assume zero marginal costs
of reproduction and distribution, firms do not put any restriction on which items a
consumer may buy; that is, price functions take the form P (n), which is the price
charged for any n items a consumer wishes to obtain.
We now turn to ex ante consumer valuations of a bundle of the consumer’s n most
preferred items. Our assumption of ex ante identical consumer value distributions
for each item implies that the ex ante value function for a consumer’s n most pre-
ferred items is the same for all consumers.7 Thus, stochastically identical ex ante item
preferences imply the same stochastic homogeneity in n-item bundle preferences. For-
mally, Vj(n) = V (n) for all customers j, where Vj(n) is the gross value to consumer
j of consuming its n most preferred items. With this specification, individuals can
differ in their rank orderings of items, as long as they value their n most preferred
the same as each other for all n ≥ 0.
We analyze this market as a duopoly game in which the two firms simultaneously
choose whether to bundle, and what price schedule to set. We assume two firms,
7Equivalently, one can think of this specification as a primitive on ex ante n-item preferences.
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which control disjoint item collections of size N1 and N2, respectively. Each can
either bundle and sell all Ni items for a single price of Pi, or sell individual items
at a unit price of pi. To solve the simultaneous game, we first solve for the pure
strategy price equilibrium in each of three possible cases: both firms bundle; neither
bundles; or only one bundles. We then consider how the bundling decision is made
and find that in this game with simultaneous pricing and bundling choice, both firms’
best strategy is to bundle. In the final subsection we make endogenous the choice of
bundle size, and obtain a surprising result on the efficiency of the outcome.
3.1 Demand
Two firms each control a collection of items, size N1 and N2 respectively. We label
the items from each firm’s collection so that nji represents the item that is the jth
consumer’s nth most preferred item from firm i. Let V (nj1, n
j
2) be consumer j’s ex
ante gross value of consuming her n1 most preferred items from collection 1 and n2
most preferred items from collection 2.8 Consumers are stochastically identical so
that V (nj1, n
j
2) = V (n1, n2) for all j. Thus if consumers knew the value of each item
before purchase, and could select which items to purchase, they would demand the
same number of items given any price function, but the set of items each demands may




≥ 0 i = 1, 2 (1)
∂2 V (n1, n2)
∂n2i
≤ 0 i = 1, 2. (2)
8Technically, the number of items chosen must be an integer, so ni should be restricted to the
set of positive whole numbers, but we simplify by assuming that n is a continuous variable. As n
becomes larger than a few items, this distinction is trivial.
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Furthermore, we restrict attention to substitute goods:9
∂2 V (n1, n2)
∂n1 ∂n2
≤ 0. (4)
This implies that for all positive ni’s:
V (n1, 0) + V (0, n2) > V (n1, n2). (5)
The two firms set price schedules P1(n1) and P2(n2). If firm i sells by the item,
Pi(ni) = pi ni, a linear function. If firm i sells only bundles, Pi(ni) = Pi, the bundle
price (the consumer receives all Ni items even if she wishes to read only ni of them).
Given price schedules, a consumer chooses the number of items he actually reads from




V (n1, n2)− C(n1, n2)
where C(·) is the cost to the consumer of purchasing the combination (n1, n2).
If each firm sells its entire collection as a bundle:
C(n1, n2) = d1P1 + d2P2
9Information may partially overlap between items offered by different firms, for example in dif-
ferent but related stories about a single news event. More generally, even substantively unrelated
items compete for scarce reader attention. Time spent reading item a cannot be used to read item
b, reducing the net value of b if one has already obtained a. Of course, there might exist comple-
mentarities, but the impact of these is beyond our scope. See Van Alstyne and Parker (2000) and
Matutes and Regibeau (1992) for models with two complementary information goods.
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where di = 1 if ni > 0 and 0 otherwise. If collection 1 is bundled and collection 2 is
sold on per item basis:
C(n1, n2) = d1P1 + n2 p2.
If both firms charge on a per item basis, then:
C(n1, n2) = n1 p1 + n2 p2.
3.2 Pricing Game
We start to solve the model by first taking as given each firm’s decision whether to
bundle or sell items individually. Firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices.
We derive the pure strategy Bertrand equilibria for the different combinations of
bundling strategy. A pair of prices is a Bertrand equilibrium if neither firm could
increase its profit by unilaterally changing its prices assuming the other firm does not
change its price.
3.2.1 Both Firms Bundle
Firm i sells its bundled collection at price Pi. Since consumers are stochastically
identical, firm i’s profit will be Pi if the bundle is purchased, else zero. In equilibrium
each firm must sell its content, or, the non-selling firm could do strictly better by
lowering its price until consumers are willing to purchase its bundle. Consequently,
each firm charges the highest Pi that induces consumers to purchase its bundle.
The relevant margin is for the consumer choice between purchasing only one bun-
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dle and purchasing both.10
VB ≡ V (N1, N2)
V1 ≡ V (N1, 0)
V2 ≡ V (0, N2)
The consumer’s surpluses for these consumption options are given by:
CSB = VB − P1 − P2 (6)
CS1 = V1 − P1 (7)
CS2 = V2 − P2 (8)
The optimal consumer decisions are shown in Figure 1.




















The unique equilibrium prices are:
PB1 = VB − V2 PB2 = VB − V1 (9)
10Since we consider only substitutes, not complements, the choice between buying neither bundle
and buying both is not relevant to the firm’s decision. Suppose a consumer wishes to purchase
neither bundle at current prices. If firm 1 lowers Pi a little the consumer may decide to purchase
bundle N1. However, since the items in N1 and N2 are substitutes, the consumer will now value N2
less, and thus will not choose to purchase both bundles.
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where the superscript designates the other firm’s strategy. Each consumer purchases
both collections so profit to firm i equals PBi . Neither firm has an incentive to
unilaterally deviate from these prices. Suppose firm 1 chooses PB1 − ε. Then, all
consumers still buy his collection but now at a lower price, and thus a lower profit.
If firm 1 raises its price to PB1 + ε, then CS2 > CSB.
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3.2.2 One firm bundles, the other unbundles
Suppose firm 1 sells its collection as a bundle and firm 2 sells items separately. There
is no pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium except for an uninteresting extreme case.
If buying separate items from firm 2, a consumer will choose n2 such that the
marginal value of an additional item is just equal to p2. Let the number of items a
consumer purchases from firm 2 at per item price p2 be n2(p1, p2) where p1 indicates
the marginal price to the consumer for an item from collection 1. So, quantity con-
sumed from firm 2 will be n2(0, p2) if she also purchases firm 1’s bundle and n2(P1, p2)
is she doesn’t purchase firm 1’s bundle.12 Any candidate equilibria must induce the
consumer to purchase items from both firms since from (3) a firm can do strictly
better than earning zero profit.
Begin with firm 1’s decision. Firm 1 earns profit of P1 if consumers buy its bundle,
or zero otherwise. Thus, firm 1 wants to price just low enough so that the bundle
will be purchased, taking p2 as given. Let P
I∗
1 be the price that makes the consumer
indifferent between buying both the bundle and some separate items versus only
11Using the surplus definitions in (6)-(8) and substituting the equilibrium prices in (9), we have
CS2 = V2 − P2 = V1 − (VB − V2) and CSB = VB − P1 − P2 = V1 − P1 = V1 − (VB − V2 + ε) < CS2.
Consumers would only buy firm 2’s bundle, reducing firm 1’s profit to zero.
12Recall that when a consumer purchases a bundle, all items from collection 1 are available at no
additional cost.
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purchasing separate items; that is, so that CSBI = CS0I . From this condition, we
obtain firm 1’s profit-maximizing price:
P I∗1 (p2) = V (N1, n2(p2, N1))− V (0, n2(p2, 0)) + p2 [n2(P1, p2)− n2(0, p2)]
Now, turn to firm 2’s decision. Given firm 1’s bundle is purchased, firm 2’s profit
is:
ΠBA2 (p2) = p2 n2(0, p2)
We can show that this cannot be the optimum choice of p2 if n2(0, p2) < N2. Since,
from (5), items are imperfect substitutes:
n2(0, p2) < n2(P1, p2)
Since P1 was set to make the consumer just indifferent about buying firm 1’s bundle,
we know that by slightly reducing p2 firm 2 can obtain a discrete jump in item sales
by inducing consumers to forego firm 1’s bundle. Thus, firm 2’s profit increases to:
Π0A2 (p2) = (p2 − ε) n2(P1, p2)
Firm 1 wants to lower its price just enough to prevent consumers from buying only
from firm 2; firm 2 wants to lower its price enough to become the sole provider.
One candidate pure strategy equilibrium remains. Define p̂2 such that n2(0, p̂2) =
N2. A slight reduction in p2 will no longer result in a jump in item sales. Let p
∗
2 be
the price that maximizes firm 2’s profit given that firm 1’s bundle is also consumed:
p∗2 = argmax p2 max [n2(0, p2), N2]
There is a pure strategy equilibrium with prices P I∗1 (p̂2) and p̂2 only if p̂2 = p
∗
2. This
is a corner solution in which firm 2 maximizes profit at a price such that consumers
purchase every item in its collection. This case is somewhat uninteresting because
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all content is inframarginal. In general, one would expect firm 2 to produce some
content that was marginal in value. If p∗2 < p̂2 (which we expect to be the general





to extract all remaining consumer surplus. But, then a slight reduction in p2 would
cause a discrete jump in sales and thus higher profit for firm 2.
3.2.3 Both firms sell unbundled items
Suppose both firms only offer unbundled items. At prices p1 and p2, a consumer’s
demands are n1(p1, p2) and n2(p1, p2). Consumers choose ni such that the marginal
value of an additional item from collection i equals pi. The concavity assumption
in (1) and (2) implies that ∂ni(p1,p2)
∂pi
≤ 0 and (4) implies ∂ni(p1,p2)
∂pj
≥ 0 for i 6= j.








Let pI1 and p
I
2 be the prices that solve these equations. The profit to each firm in this








3.3 The Bundling Decision
We now turn to the solution of the complete game, in which firms simultaneously
choose whether to bundle in addition to setting price. We characterize the first-
best solution for a firm that chooses a price schedule, Pi(ni), given the other firm’s
16
pricing choice.13 Then, we show that bundling attains this first-best solution whereas
unbundling does not.
The first-best solution
Firm 1 chooses a price schedule, P1(n1), to maximize its profits given firm 2’s price
schedule. P1(0) must equal zero because consumer participation is voluntary. Since
marginal cost is zero and the consumer population is normalized to one, if ne1 items are
purchased in equilibrium, firm 1’s profit equals P1(n
e
1). Given firm 2’s price schedule,
let n2(n1) be the number of items from collection 2 a consumer chooses to purchase if
n1 items from collection 1 are also consumed. Note that n2(n
L
1 ) ≥ n2(nH1 ) if nL1 < nH2
since the goods are substitutes.
For a consumer to purchase ne1 items from firm 1, this choice must yield at least
as much surplus as choosing 0 items. So, with a bit of rearrangement:
P1(n
e
1) ≤ V (ne1, n2(ne1))− P2 (n2(ne1))− [V (0, n2(0))− P2 (n2(0))]
Firm 1’s profits are P1(n
e
1). Thus, profits are maximized when this condition is
satisfied with a strict equality so that the firm is extracting the entire residual surplus:
P1(n
e




1))− P2 (n2(ne1))− [V (0, n2(0))− P2 (n2(0))] (10)
Equation (10) identifies the first-best price given any ne1. We now turn to the
optimum choice of ne1. Suppose that (1) holds with a strict inequality for all n1 ≤ N1 so
that all items in collection 1 are valued by the consumer.14 Then, taking a derivative
13Bundling and unbundling are each subcases of this general price schedule. For bundling, Pi(ni) =
Pi if ni > 0, else zero. For unbundling, Pi(ni) = pi ni.
14The results can easily be modified if this restriction is relaxed. Suppose, ∂ V (n1,n2(n1))∂ n1 > 0 only
for n1 ≤ N̂1 where N̂1 < N1. The first-best solution has N̂1 ≤ ne1 ≤ N1 instead of condition (11).
The two propositions that follow will still be valid.
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of (10) and applying the envelope theorem,
∂ P1(ne1)
∂ ne1
> 0 for all n1 < N1. Firm 1 can
offer at most N1 items in equilibrium. The first-best solution is to offer all of these
items since all have some value to the consumer:
ne1 = N1 (11)
Conditions (10) and (11) characterize the first-best solution. We are now ready
to prove our two main results:
Proposition 1 Bundling achieves the first-best solution to a firm’s profit-maximization
problem.
Proof: With a bundle price, a consumer gets access to all items at a flat rate
so condition (11) is met. Then, given the other firm’s price schedule, a firm can
choose its bundle price in order to satisfy (10): P1 = V (N1, n2(N1))− P2 (n2(N1))−
[V (0, n2(0))− P2 (n2(0))].15 Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 Unbundling yields less profit than the first-best solution.
Proof: Suppose firm 1 sets a linear price of p1 and n
e
1 items are purchased in




1 is chosen by the consumer such that
∂ V (ne1,n2(ne1))
∂ n1
= p1. Profit at the first-best solution is given in (10) with n
e
1 = N1.
Calculating the difference in profit between the first-best solution and linear pricing



















P2 (n2(0))− P2 (n2(N1))
]
15Note, the price equilibrium when both firms bundle is given by (9). Substituting these prices
into the (10) yields: VB − V2 = VB − (VB − V1)− [V2 − (VB − V1)]. This identity does indeed hold.
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The term in the second pair of brackets is non-negative since n2(0) ≥ n2(N1). The
first bracketed term is positive. This can be seen by noting that V (N1, n2(N1)) −





d n1. Also note that n
e
1 ≤ N1. The sum of the marginal








must exceed the sum of a







. Thus, the first-best profit exceeds the profits from linear
pricing. Q.E.D.
The intuition for these results is informative. Item sales do not extract their entire
marginal value. The item price equals the marginal value of the last item consumed
by the reader. All previous items have higher marginal values but the firm only
receives the value of the least preferred item that is read. Furthermore, not all items
of positive value are necessarily purchased by the consumer when sales are made on
a per-item basis. This is inefficient (and unprofitable) since the cost of producing
additional copies is zero. Bundling encourages a higher level of consumption. And,
bundling enables the firm to capture the full residual value of each unit of content.
This logic, taking firm 2’s behavior as given, is identical to the argument for the
superiority of a two-part tariff over a linear price for a monopolist in Oi (1971).
3.4 Endogenous Product Creation
Although digital information goods have negligible marginal costs of reproduction and
distribution, there may be significant sunk (first-copy) creation costs. If competition
significantly reduces operating profits, investment in new information products may
be low. We examine the impact of competition on new product creation in this
subsection.
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Consider the following two-stage game with no discounting. Let Fi be the sunk
costs incurred by firm i in order to create Ni items, with Ni fixed exogenously (i
= 1, 2).16 In the first stage, the duopolists simultaneously decide whether to invest
to create content. In the second stage, the firms set prices on their bundles. If
both firms invest, then the Bertrand equilibrium in which both firms bundle their
collections (PB1 , P
B
2 ) will obtain. If only one firm invests, that firm will charge the
monopoly price (Vi) in the second period. The figure below presents the normal form
of this game:
Firm 2
Invest Do Not Invest
Invest (VB − V2 − F1, VB − V1 − F2) (V1 − F1, 0)
Firm 1
Do Not Invest (0, V2 − F2) (0, 0)
Payoffs = (Firm 1’s net profit, Firm 2’s net profit)
We prove two results:
Proposition 3 If it is socially efficient for both firms to invest, then invest is the
dominant strategy for both firms.
Proof: By assumption (invest, invest) is the social optimum, so VB − F1 − F2 =
max{VB − F1 − F2, V1 − F1, V2 − F2, 0}. Combining the implied inequalities with the
assumption that VB < V1 + V2 (Eq. 5) yields VB − V2 − F1 > 0 and V1 − F1 > 0 so
16In section 5 we determine Ni endogenously. We show that duopolists choose an inefficiently
small collection.
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(invest,·) is the dominant strategy for firm 1, and likewise for firm 2 by symmetry.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 If Vi < Fi (it is not efficient for firm i to invest even if were the sole
source of items), then firm j will invest if and only if it is efficient to do so (Vj ≥ Fj).
Proof: By assumption Vi < Fi, which together with (5) implies that VB−Vk−Fi <
0. Therefore, firm i’s dominant strategy is to not invest. Knowing that it will be the
sole provider if it invests, firm k will invest if and only if Vk − Fk ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
There is a third possibility: that both firms want to invest if the other does not,
but not if the other does. In this case, Vi > Fi but VB − Vk < Fi (i 6= k). There are
two Nash equilibria, (invest, do not invest) and (do not invest, invest). One is the
social optimum, but in the other the wrong firm invests in content creation.
The latter, inefficient equilibrium is closely related to the problem of “excess
inertia” in the network externalities literature (see Farrell and Saloner 1986). In
that problem, a first mover gains control of a standard, and the positive network
externalities mean that the market cannot support both standards or systems, so the
second is not produced even though it would be socially preferred to have the new
standard replace the old.
3.5 Comparing Market Structures
We have shown that when consumers have stochastically identical demand for content,
the only pure strategy equilibrium of the complete game is for both firms to bundle
their collections. This equilibrium outcome is efficient. Each consumer has access to
all items, so the total value created by item consumption is VB.
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If a monopolist controlled all content, she would set a price PM = VB to extract
all consumer surplus. Although this too is an efficient allocation, the distribution
of surplus among the market participants is much different for these two market
structures. From (5) and (9) one can see that the total duopoly profit is less than
the monopoly profit (VB + VB − V1 − V2 < VB). Thus, some surplus is retained by
consumers (V1 + V2 − VB) when there is a duopoly.
Finally, even though profits are reduced, duopolists maintain an efficient incentive
to invest in content, at least in the situation in which the size of a collection is given
exogenously.
4 Heterogeneous Consumers
Salinger (1995) showed that bundling could be advantageous when it permits the firm
to smooth demand for multiple units. This can be thought of as the operation of the
law of large numbers: if buyer valuations are drawn from the same distribution, then
average valuation will tend to converge to the distribution mean as the number of
items increases, and the firm can extract more of the surplus by bundling and setting
the price to N times the mean. This value averaging effect is the main result in
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1998) as well. Of course this effect is most pronounced when
consumer valuations are distributionally identical. If consumer preferences are truly
heterogeneous, then bundling as an averaging device will not be as effective, and as
shown by Chuang and Sirbu (1998) may even be dominated by per item selling.
Therefore, in this section we analyze competition between two information good
producers when consumer preferences are heterogeneous. We also compare the per-
formance of the duopoly to a monopoly market.
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We need to impose some structure on preferences across individual consumers.
Assume that a consumer who reads n1 items from collection 1 and n2 items from
collection 2 will value her jth best item from collection i at:17







k(N1 + N2)− n1 − n2
k(N1 + N2)
(12)
in which wo is the value of the consumer’s best item, and k is the percent of items
that would have positive value to the consumer if it were the only item available.18
This formulation extends Chuang and Sirbu (1998). Consumers rank the items in the
collection, with a higher n representing a less valuable item.
The last term of (12) is our innovation. As one consumes a greater number of
items (ni rises), each available item is less valuable to the consumer (versus the value
that item would have had if fewer items had been consumed). This implies that items
are imperfect substitutes.
The total value of consuming the n1 best items from collection 1 and the n2 best
items from collection 2 is given by:
































where Ntot = N1 + N2 and ntot = n1 + n2. Given prices for each collection (P1(n1),
P2(n2)), consumers choose n1 and n2 to maximize their surplus net of the cost of
acquiring those items.
We have not been able to solve analytically for Nash strategies in this game
for a fully general distribution of heterogeneous consumer preferences. Therefore
17For notational convenience, superscripts for consumers on wo and k have been omitted.
18k may be quite small. A given consumer likely will only be interested in a small fraction of the
information goods available.
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Heterogeneous value breadth (k)
we employ numerical simulation methods to analyze the markets. We consider two
environments. In the first we allow value intensity to vary, but fix the percentage of
items that each consumer values: wo is distributed uniformly on [0, 1] and k = 0.3.
In the second environment we fix intensity (wo = 1) and vary breadth (k ∼ U [0, 1]).
Notice that both sources of heterogeneity lead to variation in the slope of a consumer’s
valuations of items rank ordered according to her preferences (see Figure 2).
In Table 1 we present as a benchmark the socially optimal outcomes for a single
firm that has 1000 items to sell, and the monopoly outcomes for bundling these
items, selling them separately, or offering a mixed bundle (consumer chooses between
a bundle or separate items). In this and the subsequent tables, Pi is the bundle price
charged by firm i, pi is the unit price set by firm i if it sells individual items, and
Πi is the profit received by firm i. CS is the value of consumers’ surplus. Welfare
is consumers’ surplus plus total profits. QB represents the number of consumers
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Table 1: Monopoly owns the entire collection
N = 1000, k = .3, wo ∼ U [0, 1]
% of
Description Pm pm QB QI Profit CS Welfare Optimum
Social Optimum 1.0 126.8 28.9 100.0
Bundling 29.1 0.5 14.5 7.12 21.6 74.7
Unbundling 0.27 42.4 11.4 8.95 20.4 70.6
Mixed Bundling 29.1 ≥ .51 0.5 0.0 14.5 7.12 21.6 74.7
N = 1000, wo = 1, k ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 1 211.3 96.2 100.0
Bundling 96.2 0.5 48.1 24.1 72.2 75.0
Unbundling 0.47 98.0 46.1 25.0 71.1 73.7
Mixed Bundling 112.4 0.66 0.35 25.6 56.1 20.5 76.6 79.6
who purchase the bundle. QI represents the number of items that are purchased
separately.19
In Tables 2-4 we present outcomes when 1000 items are sold from two separate
collections. We calculate the Bertrand equilibria (when they exist) and Stackleberg
equilibria for two firms that follow one of our three strategy pairs: both bundle; both
sell separate items; or one bundles and the other sells items. We also present the
monopoly outcome for a single firm that sells items from two collections following
the same strategy pairs for collections as in the corresponding oligopoly cases (e.g.,
a monopolist selling the two collections as separate sub-bundles versus two firms
that each bundle their own collection). We also report the socially optimal outcome
for each pricing structure. To further explore market structure effects, we calculate
outcomes for several different ratios of collection size.
19At the social optimum, each consumer has access to all articles that are positively valued. For
the first consumer population, this is an average of 126.8 articles; for the second set of consumers,
this average is 211.3 articles.
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4.1 Monopoly
We report in Table 1 the profit-maximizing results for a monopolist who follows one
of three strategies to sell 1000 items. The top panel is for a consumer population het-
erogeneous in value intensity; the bottom panel is for heterogeneity in value breadth.
In Tables 2, 3 and 4 we report the outcomes for a monopolist selling sub-collections
rather than all content together. Evidently the monopolist should not sub-bundle.
Bundling and mixed bundling monopoly profits are higher when the collection is
priced as a whole (N = 1000) rather than separated into parts (N1 = N2 = 500 or
N1 = 400, N2 = 600). There is a simple explanation. Individual items are (imperfect)
substitutes for each other. By introducing sub-bundles, the monopolist competes with
itself. It is important to remember that the inferiority of sub-bundling is shown only
in cases with zero marginal cost. It is easy to show that with positive marginal cost
sub-bundling can be a superior strategy, as we observe in consumer magazine and
scholarly journal publishing, for example.
Another interesting result is that sub-bundling by a monopolist also leads to
lower social welfare than mixed bundling. Consider the following simple example:
Consumers are stochastically identical and the entire collection is equally divided
into two parts. Suppose that the consumers value each 500-item collection at $14,
but value the entire 1000-item collection at $20. A monopolist who sold all 1000
items as a bundle would set price at $20 and extract the consumer’s entire valuation.
However, if the monopolist sells two equal-sized sub-bundles, it can no longer extract
$20. If each collection is priced at $10, the consumer will respond by only choosing
one of the two collections, earning a net surplus of $4 (as opposed to zero surplus if
she were to purchase both sub-bundles). Thus, the monopolist would earn only $10 in
revenue. The optimal sub-bundle price is then $14. Consumers will purchase only one
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sub-bundle and revenues will be $14. However, if the monopolist introduced mixed
bundling, it could sell some articles from the second collection, thus increasing total
consumption and social welfare. Our numerical results suggest that mixed bundling
continues to be socially preferred when consumers are heterogeneous.
4.2 Duopoly
We report duopoly outcomes for a variety of firm sizes in Tables 2-4. All calculated
duopoly equilibria (Bertrand or Stackleberg) are more efficient than their monopoly
counterparts.20
4.2.1 Both Firms Bundle
In Table 2 we report the results when both firms bundle. The most evident feature
of this case is that there are no Bertrand equilibria in pure strategies. For any pair
of prices (P1, P2), there will be three categories of consumers: (a) those that will
buy both bundles; (b) those that will buy only one bundle; and (c) those that will
buy nothing. If firm 2 charges a relatively high price, firm 1 maximizes profits by
undercutting firm 2 so that of those in category (b), all choose firm 1 over firm
2. However, if firm 2’s price is low enough, firm 1 is better off ignoring those in
category (b) and instead switching to a higher price which maximizes profits on
sales to consumers in category (a). This results in a discontinuity in each firm’s
reaction function and thus no equilibrium in pure strategies.21 Therefore, we calculate
equilibrium results for a market in which one of the firms is a Stackelberg leader.
20For the Stackleberg results the number in parentheses indicates the firm that leads.
21A proof of this result is available in an appendix available from the authors upon request. If
collection sizes are substantially different, a pure strategy equilibrium can exist since firms target
different niches.
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Table 2: Duopoly: Both Firms Bundle
N1 = N2 = 500, k = .3, wo ∼ U [0, 1]
Description P1 P2 Π1 Π2 CS Welfare % of Optimum
Social Optimum 28.9 100
Monopoly ≥ 22.2 22.2 0.0 11.1 5.56 16.7 57.7
Bertrand No pure-strategy equilibrium exists
Stackleberg (1) 3.62 6.65 3.33 3.33 20.4 27.1 93.8
N1 = 400, N2 = 600, k = .3, wo ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 28.9 100.0
Monopoly ≥ 19.7 24.2 0.0 12.1 6.06 18.2 62.8
Bertrand No pure-strategy equilibrium exists
Stackleberg (1) 3.8 9.1 3.44 4.6 18.4 26.5 91.6
Stackleberg (2) 4.7 9.1 4.07 4.66 17.6 26.4 91.2
N1 = N2 = 500, wo = 1, k ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 96.2 100.0
Monopoly ≥ 74.1 74.1 0.0 37.0 18.5 55.6 57.7
Bertrand No pure-strategy equilibrium exists
Stackleberg (1) 12.1 22.2 11.1 11.1 68.1 90.2 93.8
N1 = 400, N2 = 600, wo = 1, k ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 96.2 100.0
Monopoly ≥ 65.8 80.8 0.0 40.4 20.2 60.6 63.0
Bertrand No pure-strategy equilibrium exists
Stackleberg (1) 12.8 30.4 11.6 15.3 61.3 88.2 91.6
Stackleberg (2) 15.6 30.5 13.7 15.4 58.7 87.8 91.2
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Table 3: Duopoly: Firm 1 bundles, firm 2 sells separate items
N1 = N2 = 500, k = .3, wo ∼ U [0, 1]
Description P1 p2 Π1 Π2 CS Welfare % of Optimum
Social Optimum 28.9 100.0
Monopoly 17.2 0.25 8.6 3.18 8.96 20.7 71.8
Bertrand 8.2 0.09 5.35 3.42 17.9 26.7 92.3
Stackleberg (1) 9.5 0.1 5.53 3.83 16.7 26.1 90.2
Stackleberg (2) 8.2 0.09 5.35 3.42 17.9 26.7 92.3
N1 = 400, N2 = 600, k = .3, wo ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 28.9 100.0
Monopoly 14.3 0.25 6.99 4.6 9.08 20.7 71.5
Bertrand 5.9 0.09 4.24 3.93 18.8 27.0 93.3
Stackleberg (1) 5.2 0.14 4.51 3.66 17.7 25.9 89.7
Stackleberg (2) 7.92 0.15 5.96 3.97 15.4 25.3 87.6
N1 = 600, N2 = 400, k = .3, wo ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 28.9 100.0
Monopoly 24.3 0.48 12.1 0.02 6.01 18.1 62.7
Bertrand 10.8 0.09 6.59 2.87 16.8 26.2 90.8
Stackleberg (1) 12.4 0.1 6.75 3.23 15.5 25.5 88.3
Stackleberg (2) 10.8 0.09 6.59 2.87 16.8 26.2 90.8
N1 = N2 = 500, wo = 1, k ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 96.3 100.0
Monopoly 85.1 0.66 30.6 12.5 16.3 59.4 61.6
Bertrand 36.6 0.23 18.6 14.6 51.6 84.7 88.0
Stackleberg (1) 36.5 0.23 18.6 14.6 51.6 84.7 87.9
Stackleberg (2) 40.9 0.275 20.3 15.0 46.6 81.9 85.0
N1 = 400, N2 = 600, wo = 1, k ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 96.3 100.0
Monopoly 66.3 0.435 15.0 25.9 25.8 66.7 69.2
Bertrand 30.8 0.25 15.3 18.9 50.5 84.6 87.8
Stackleberg (1) 31.1 0.255 15.4 18.9 49.9 84.2 87.4
Stackleberg (2) 33.0 0.285 16.4 19.2 46.9 82.4 85.6
N1 = 600, N2 = 400, wo = 1, k ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 96.3 100.0
Monopoly 90.6 0.675 35.6 9.61 17.6 62.8 65.2
Bertrand 44.5 0.205 22.2 11.2 50.7 84.1 87.3
Stackleberg (1) 48.4 0.215 22.4 11.9 48.2 82.5 85.7
Stackleberg (2) 47.3 0.24 23.4 11.5 47.5 82.4 85.5
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In welfare terms, consumers’ surplus in the Stackelberg equilibrium with both
firms bundling is typically three times higher than for a monopoly (whether it bundles
– Table 1 – or sub-bundles as in Table 2). Competition also reduces combined profit
to about half the monopoly level. Overall, social welfare tends to be about 40%
higher under duopoly than with a sub-bundling monopoly; the advantage is about
20% compared to a bundling monopoly (Table 1).
4.2.2 One firm bundles, one firm sells separate items
In Table 3 we report duopoly outcomes when only the first firm bundles its collection.
A Bertrand equilibrium exists, and is quite similar to both Stackleberg equilibria for
a given distribution of collection sizes and consumer types. A striking result is that
the bundling firm is at a decided advantage. For example, in the second panel we
show that firm 1 obtains higher profits even though firm 2 has the larger collection
to sell. Even in the second-to-last panel, in which firm 2 has higher total profit than
firm 1, the first firm earns higher per item profit by bundling. These results are
consistent with the finding for stochastically identical consumers that bundling offers
a competitive advantage over unbundling.
4.2.3 Both firms sell separate items
We report in Table 4 the duopoly outcomes when both firms sell separate items. Item
prices are substantially lower than with a monopoly. Combined profits do not decline
as much as prices, however. Social welfare from a duopoly is about 20-25% higher
than for a monopoly.
When we compare welfare across pricing strategies for a duopoly, we see that
bundling is much more efficient than selling content on a per item basis. Consumers
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Table 4: Duopoly: Both Firms Sell Separate Items
N1 = N2 = 500, k = .3, wo ∼ U [0, 1]
Description p1 p2 Π1 Π2 CS Welfare % of Optimum
Social Optimum 28.9 100.0
Monopoly 0.27 0.27 5.72 5.72 8.96 20.4 70.6
Bertrand 0.134 .134 4.69 4.69 16.5 25.8 89.4
Stackleberg (1) 0.17 0.15 4.83 5.29 14.8 24.9 86.1
N1 = 400, N2 = 600, k = .3, wo ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 28.9 100.0
Monopoly 0.27 0.27 4.58 6.87 8.96 20.4 70.6
Bertrand 0.133 0.15 4.01 5.64 15.9 25.5 88.2
Stackleberg (1) 0.135 0.15 4.01 5.68 15.8 25.5 88.2
Stackleberg (2) 0.145 0.175 4.37 5.78 14.6 24.8 85.6
N1 = N2 = 500, wo = 1, k ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 96.3 100.0
Monopoly 0.47 0.47 23.0 23.0 25.0 71.1 73.8
Bertrand 0.296 0.296 20.1 20.1 45.3 85.6 88.8
Stackleberg (1) 0.32 0.305 20.3 20.9 43.1 84.4 87.6
N1 = 400, N2 = 600, wo = 1, k ∼ U [0, 1]
Social Optimum 96.3 100.0
Monopoly 0.47 0.47 18.4 27.6 25.0 71.1 73.8
Bertrand 0.287 0.314 16.7 23.9 44.4 85.0 88.3
Stackleberg (1) 0.31 0.32 16.8 24.7 42.7 84.2 87.4
Stackleberg (2) 0.295 0.335 17.4 24.1 42.4 83.9 87.1
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retain much of the surplus gain because bundling duopolists fiercely compete. Indeed,
in our simulations combined firm profits are lower when both firms bundle. For
example, when firms are of equal size, firm 1 is the Stackleberg leader, k = .3 for all
consumers, wo is uniformly distributed from zero to one, and both firms bundle, each
will earn a profit of $3.33 (Table 2). However, if both firms sold items separately
profits would increase by more than 50% (to $4.83 and $5.29 respectively). But
switching to item sales cuts consumers’ surplus by $5.69 (from $20.44 to $14.75).
The decrease in consumers’ surplus exceeds the total magnitude in gains to firms’
profits, so efficiency is higher with bundling.
4.3 Endogenous Bundling Decisions: Mixed Bundling
We now consider a game in which firms simultaneously choose a bundle and a per item
price and offer both to consumers. This is known as mixed bundling. Pure bundling
and pure unbundling are special cases of mixed bundling: choosing an infinite bundle
price is equivalent to playing “sell separately” as a pure strategy. Likewise, an infinite
item price is equivalent to “bundle.” Of course, by choosing intermediate prices, firms
can offer a mixture of bundles and separate items to a heterogeneous population, so
the strategy space is richer.22
Mixed bundling was considered by Chuang and Sirbu (1998) for a monopolist. Not
surprisingly, since it nests bundling and item sales, they found that mixed bundling
weakly dominated the two pure strategies. We examine profits, prices and wel-
fare when competing firms simultaneously choose their bundling strategy and prices
through playing a mixed bundling game.23
22When consumers are stochastically identical mixed bundling is irrelevant because all consumers
will make the same choice: either purchase a bundle or purchase separate items (or neither).
23We should be clear that mixed bundling is not a mixed strategy in game theoretic terms. Both
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Let firm 1 set prices p1 and P1 at the same time firm 2 sets p2 and P2. We re-
ported the results for optimal mixed bundling by a monopolist in Table 1. When
value intensity is heterogeneous (wo ∼ U [0, 1]) bundling maximizes monopoly profits
(see Table 1). Mixed bundling performs the same by mimicking bundling (that is, by
setting price to $0.51 or higher, no separate items are purchased). However, when
value intensity is heterogeneous (k ∼ U[0,1]), mixed bundling is strictly more prof-
itable than pure bundling. With value intensity variation, consumers who would not
purchase a bundle have relatively low per-item valuations. To get them to purchase
any items separately requires a low price. However, if the monopolist did this, high-
valuation consumers would buy items separately rather than as an expensive bundle,
so the monopolist needs to set a relatively high item price and forego most item sales
when offering mixed bundling. With value breadth variation, consumers that value
only a few items (and thus are not willing to purchase the bundle) do highly value
some of the items in the collection. So, the monopolist can sell some items (at a
high price) without giving high-k consumers much incentive to switch away from the
bundle option. In this case item sales make up almost 30% of the total revenue from
mixed bundling.
In Table 5 we report the Bertrand equilibria (when they exist) for a variety of
relative firm sizes. We introduce heterogeneity in value intensity (wo ∼ U [0, 1]) in the
top panel, and in the bottom value breadth is heterogeneous.
When firms are of similar size no Bertrand equilibrium exists. This is the case in
these simulations because mixed bundling is driven by competition in bundle prices.
Selling bundles to consumers is the best way to capture most of the surplus. As a
result, when firms offer mixed bundles, the competitive pressure is most intense in the
options are offered with probability one to consumers, who may select from the menu.
33
setting of bundle prices. However, as we showed in the previous section, an equilibrium
does not exist when firms simultaneously choose bundle prices for a heterogeneous
population of consumers.
With sufficiently different firm sizes, a Bertrand equilibrium emerges because the
firms find it more profitable to target different niches: the small firm sells to consumers
who do not wish to purchase the expensive bundle that the larger firm is offering.
In Table 6 we report the equilibrium consumer choices. In columns 1I and 2I we
tabulate the population fraction that purchases items individually from firms 1 and
2, respectively. In columns 1B and 2B we tabulate the fraction purchasing bundles
from firms 1 and 2, respectively. When an equilibrium exists, most revenue is from
bundle sales. When value intensity varies (wo ∼ U [0, 1]), item sales constitute less
than .5% of total revenue. When value breadth varies [k ∼ U [0, 1]) less than 5% of
the smaller firm’s revenues come from item sales, though the larger firm can obtain
up to 30% of its revenues from item sales. It appears that bundling is the dominant
source of revenue if consumer preferences are heterogeneous, even when firms offer a
choice of bundles and individual articles. This is consistent with the experience of
most scholarly journals and consumer magazines, for example.
5 Endogenous Collection Size
To this point we have primarily focused on static efficiency. Once an information
good exists, since the marginal cost of reproduction and distribution is zero, social
welfare is maximized by distributing each item to everyone who has a positive value
for it. A duopoly competing in price does not achieve this objective completely, but
it does greatly outperform a monopolist when consumers have heterogeneous pref-
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Table 5: Bertrand Equilibria for Mixed Bundling
k = .3, wo ∼ U [0, 1]
N1 N2 P1 P2 Π1 Π2 CS Welfare
500 500 No Pure-Strategy Equilibrium Exists
460 540 No Pure-Strategy Equilibrium Exists
400 600 (0.16, 4.2) (0.14, 6.6) 2.99 4.84 19.6 27.4
300 700 (0.18, 3.2) (0.25, 11.1) 2.6 6.41 17.2 26.2
200 800 (0.19, 2.3) (0.32, 15.8) 1.72 8.62 14.7 25.0
wo = 1, k ∼ U [0, 1]
500 500 No Pure-Strategy Equilibrium Exists
400 600 No Pure-Strategy Equilibrium Exists
300 700 No Pure-Strategy Equilibrium Exists
200 800 (0.45, 8.0) (0.49, 62.0) 6.64 32.9 46.1 85.7
100 900 (0.45, 4.0) (0.57, 86.0) 3.27 43.2 34.5 81.0
Table 6: Consumer Choice and Revenue Mix for Mixed Bundling
k = .3, wo ∼ U [0, 1]
Consumer Choices Bundling Revenue (BR) BR as % of Total Rev.
N1 N2 1I 1B 2I 2B Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2
400 600 0.04 0.71 0.0 0.74 2.98 4.84 100.0 100.0
300 700 0.0 0.8 0.02 0.58 2.6 6.41 100.0 100.0
200 800 0.0 0.74 0.01 0.55 1.72 8.62 100.0 100.0
wo = 1, k ∼ U [0, 1]
200 800 0.18 0.79 0.61 0.39 6.32 24.2 95.0 73.0
100 900 0.16 0.77 0.64 0.35 3.1 30.1 95.0 70.0
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erences. Competing firms bid down prices so consumers access more positive-valued
items. However, the full social welfare story is more complicated than this. In-
formation goods have significant first-copy costs. In Section 3.4 we considered the
incentive to create a collection when both duopolists bundle a fixed-size collection
and sell to a stochastically identical consumer base. In this section we allow firms
not only to choose whether to create a collection but also how large it will be. We
assume items have convex first-copy costs. We solve a two-stage game for creation
followed by selling. First firms simultaneously choose the number of items to cre-
ate. Then they simultaneously choose prices given the collection sizes. We consider
both stochastically identical and heterogeneous consumers, allow for various bundling
and unbundling strategies, and compare the duopoly outcomes to the corresponding
monopoly outcomes.
Assume the investment cost of producing Ni items is given by:
C(Ni) = αNi + β(Ni)
2 (13)
α and β are assumed to be positive.24 In the first stage firms simultaneously choose
(N1, N2). In the second stage they compete in a pricing game (taking the bundling
decision as exogenous). Let Π1(N1, N2) and Π2(N1, N2) be the firms’ respective oper-
ating profits from this price game. Thus, firm i chooses Ni to maximize Πi(N1, N2)−
C(Ni) taking Nj as given (i 6= j). In Table 7 we provide examples of the result-
ing Nash equilibria for both stochastically identical and heterogeneous consumers
24β > 0 implies first-copy costs are convex. If there were constant returns to scale (β = 0) or
economies of scale (β < 0) then no pure-strategy equilibrium would exist. Larger collections allow
firms to extract slightly more revenue per item. With constant marginal costs of production, the
optimal number of items will either be zero or infinite. Only with increasing marginal costs will an
interior solution exist.
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Table 7: Endogenous Collection Size Cost: C(Ni) = αNi + β(Ni)
2
Bertrand Outcomes
α β Hetero? Bundle? N∗i Profits CS Welfare
.006 .00003 No Both (492, 492) (2.86, 2.86) 30.7 36.4
.006 .00003 No Neither (282, 282) (2.73, 2.73) 15.3 20.7
.008 .00003 No Both (459, 459) (2.21, 2.21) 28.6 33.0
.006 .00005 No Both (295, 295) (1.72, 1.72) 18.4 21.8
.006 .00003 k Neither (528, 528) (9.73, 9.73) 47.8 67.2
.008 .00003 k Neither (500, 500) (8.64, 8.64) 45.2 62.5
.006 .00005 k Neither (318, 318) (5.84, 5.84) 28.7 40.4
.006 .00003 k Firm 1 (495, 448) (7.76, 4.32) 48.5 60.6
.006 .00003 wo Firm 1 (125, 30) (0.33, 0.05) 1.97 2.35
Social Optimum
.006 .00003 No (862, 862) 44.6
.008 .00003 No (829, 829) 41.2
.006 .00005 No (517, 517) 26.7
.006 .00003 k (1504, 1504) 135
.008 .00003 k (1470, 1470) 130
.006 .00005 k (902, 902) 81.4
.006 .00003 wo (381, 381) 8.72
.008 .00003 wo (348, 348) 7.26
Monopoly Outcomes
.006 .00003 k Neither (667, 667) (13.4, 13.4) 33.2 59.9
.008 .00003 k Neither (634, 634) (12.1, 12.1) 31.5 55.6
.006 .00005 k Neither (400, 400) (8.0, 8.0) 19.9 35.9
.006 .00003 k Collection 1 (770, 480) (23.5, 1.21) 22.3 47.0
.006 .00003 wo Neither (91, 91) (0.247, 0.247) 1.63 2.12
.006 .00003 wo Collection 1 (145, 45) (1.02, –.33) 1.24 1.93
.008 .00003 wo Neither (57, 57) (.1,.1) 1.02 1.22
for those bundling strategies that have a pure-strategy Bertrand equilibrium in the
pricing game. For comparison, we also present the outcomes which maximize social
welfare and monopoly profits. For the monopoly outcome, the firm chooses N1, N2,
P1 and P2 in order to maximize its total profit (revenue less investment costs) from
the two collections.
When consumers are stochastically identical (the first four lines of Table 7), a
duopoly creates too little content. Recall that a bundling monopolist extracts all of
consumers’ surplus by setting a price of VB for the entire pool of items. As a result,
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the monopolist’s objective function is the same as a social welfare maximizer’s. With
α = .006, β = .0003, a monopolist would maximize profits and social welfare by
creating two bundles each with 862 items and charging a bundle price of $99.56 to
consumers for access to both collections, which would yield social welfare of $44.56.
Each duopolist in equilibrium will create only 492 items. Consumers purchase both
bundles so there is efficient distribution of the created content. Due to undercreation,
however, social welfare is 81.6% of the maximum (36.4 compared to 44.6). If each firm
is selling items separately, welfare is further reduced. Per-item pricing extracts less
consumers’ surplus than bundling so firms have a lower incentive to create content. As
a result each firm creates only 282 items. Furthermore, items that are produced will
not be distributed efficiently since consumers face a price of $.30 on the margin. If a
consumer values an item between zero and thirty cents, the item will not be consumed
even though it would be efficient to do so since its marginal distribution cost is zero.
As a result of these two sources of inefficiency social welfare under per-item pricing
reaches only 46% of the optimum (20.7 compared to 44.6).
With heterogeneous consumers the story is quite different. A duopoly creates less
than efficient amount of content since firms are unable to capture all of the surplus
from that content. However, the same is now true for the monopolist since consumers
differ in their aggregate valuations. Of course, a monopolist captures more surplus
than the duopolists, so the monopolist has the greater incentive to invest in content.
However, a monopolist charges higher prices which distort the distribution of those
items that are produced. The results in Table 7 indicate that this second effect
dominates: for corresponding cases the duopoly social welfare is always higher than
from a monopoly. With α = .006 and β = .00003, wo = 1 for all consumers, value
breadth heterogeneous (k ∼ U [0, 1]), the (row 4) efficient outcome is to produce 1504
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items in each collection, achieving a social welfare of $135. A monopolist who sold
items separately would set price at $.47 and produce 667 items in each collection
(row 1 of the monopoly panel). Each duopoly firm would price at $.30 and produce
528 items (row 5 in the duopoly panel). The duopoly achieves a higher social welfare
(67 > 60).
The same result holds if collection 1 is bundled rather than sold on a per-item
basis. There is a greater incentive to produce content for collection 1 since bundling
extracts greater surplus than unbundling, especially if wo varies across consumers.
Even though a duopoly results in the creation of fewer items (row 8 duopoly vs. row
4 monopoly), they are distributed more efficiently because a monopolist would set
much higher prices.
Throughout the paper we have stressed the static welfare gains from more efficient
distribution by competing firms. When we consider the dynamic issue of new content
creation, the social performance of monopoly improves because it can extract more
surplus and thus creates closer to the optimal amount of content. However, with
heterogeneous consumer preferences, we find across all of our numerical simulations
that the duopoly distribution advantage exceeds the monopoly creation advantage,
and thus the duopoly is still preferred on social welfare grounds.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we explored the interaction between competition and the bundling
of electronically-delivered information goods. Some of the results from the previ-
ous monopoly-focused literature hold for a duopoly. For example, when consumers
have stochastically identical total valuations for the aggregate collection and there
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are no marginal costs of production for existing information goods, bundling is more
profitable than unbundling. However, consumer homogeneity has unreasonable im-
plications for monopoly efficiency and for the distribution of surplus between firms
and consumers. One of our main contributions is to focus attention on bundling
(monopoly and competitive) with heterogeneous consumers. With diverse prefer-
ences, bundling is not guaranteed to be superior to separate item sales. In addition,
a duopoly, compared to a monopoly, yields much lower prices and slightly less profit
regardless of the bundling strategies employed.
Lower industry profit in a static analysis implies a dynamic concern: lower incen-
tives to create new content. We find that the dynamic implication with stochastically
identical consumers is again reassuring (fully efficient creation incentives, even with
a duopoly) – but unrealistic. When we study the problem of creation incentives with
heterogeneous consumers, we discover a trade-off. A monopoly is likely to produce
closer to the efficient amount of content. However, the higher prices on existing con-
tent that a monopolist charges lead to efficiency losses in distribution that tend to
outweigh the efficiency gains from having more content. As a result, a duopoly is
welfare-improving even though it is likely to result in fewer total information goods.
From a strategic perspective we reinforce the emerging view that bundling is
a powerful tool. However, it also results in rather fierce competition between firms.
Consequently, consumers benefit from competitive bundling. Fierce competition leads
to more potential readers having access to the content due to the lower subscrip-
tion fees. Furthermore, bundling results in efficient consumption decisions since sub-
scribers face no extra fee for accessing additional items.
There are a number of questions left for future work. In our current model, a
random item selected from one firm has the same expected value to a given consumer
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as a random item selected from the other firm. In fact, when consumers differ in their
tastes, some are more likely to favor items from one firm while others favor another
firm.25 The degree of competition between firms is weakened, which we might expect
would result in higher equilibrium prices and thus greater distribution inefficiency.
We ignored several characteristics of the cost structure for most information goods.
Although marginal costs of production are quite low, these costs are still positive. For
non-negligible marginal costs, Chuang and Sirbu (1998) show that pure unbundling
will be more profitable than pure bundling for a monopolist in the absence of large
economies of scale. In addition, we ignored transaction costs. Each time a consumer
purchases a product, terms must be negotiated and an exchange of payment for the
good must be implemented. These transaction costs are another source of efficiency
gain for bundling, which reduces the number of separate transactions. On the other
hand, search costs are likely to reduce the incentive to bundle. If a firm offers a
large, varied bundle, consumers will have a difficult time locating those items which
are most valuable to them. This may induce firms to offer smaller, niche-oriented
bundles.
Finally, we would like to explore a richer set of bundling possibilities. Like the
previous literature, we have focused on bundling, unbundling, and mixed bundling.
With N goods, firms could form up to 2N−1 bundles and price each individually. Such
a model is infeasible to solve for reasonable N . However, we would like to understand
how competition is affected if firms use more complex bundling and pricing strategies
than we have thus far considered.
25Fay (2001) begins to analyze the effects of such product differences on the distribution of surplus
among the market participants.
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